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MONTREAL, April 21, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada will hold a conference call for analysts on Friday, May 5, 2017 to present first quarter 2017 results. Air Canada President and Chief
MONTREAL, April 21, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada announced today its participation in the Civil Aviation Alternate Fuel Contrail and Emissions Research project (CAAFCER), a research project led by the
MONTREAL, April 20, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada has been recognized for the fourth year in a row as one of "Montreal's Top Employers" in an annual employer survey by
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, 20 April 2017 – In its investigation report (A15A0054) released today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) found that ineffective crew resource management and an unstable approach led to the August 2015 hard landing of a Beechcraft King Air A100 in Margaree, Nova Scotia.
On 16 August 2015, a Beechcraft King Air A100 operated by Maritime Air Charter Limited was on a flight from Halifax Stanfield International Airport to Margaree Aerodrome, Nova Scotia, with two pilots and two passengers on board. While conducting a visual approach to Runway 01, the aircraft touched down hard approximately 260 feet beyond the runway threshold. Almost immediately, the right main landing gear collapsed, causing the right propeller and wing to contact the runway. The aircraft then slid along the runway for about 1350 feet before veering off the runway to the right. There were no injuries, though the aircraft was substantially damaged.
The investigation found that the crew did not anticipate that landing on a short runway at an unfamiliar aerodrome with high terrain nearby would increase their workload during the approach and landing phase. This increased workload led to the crew's reduced situational awareness. As a result, the crew did not recognize the aircraft's steep rate of descent as being indicative of an unstable approach condition. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold with insufficient energy to reduce the rate of descent immediately before touchdown, resulting in the hard landing.
The findings of this investigation are consistent with a lack of effective crew resource management (CRM). If CRM is not used and continuously fostered, there is a risk that pilots will be unprepared to avoid or mitigate errors encountered during flight. The TSB issued a recommendation (A09-02) which called for Transport Canada (TC) to require smaller commercial operators to provide its crews with modern CRM training. TC has proposed new standards, which should address the safety deficiencies once implemented, thus the Board has assessed TC's action as Satisfactory Intent.
Although not required, Maritime Air Charter had voluntarily implemented a safety management system (SMS). However, the SMS elements were primarily used as a reactive method to address potential safety concerns. If organizations do not use modern safety management practices, there is an increased risk that hazards will not be identified and risks mitigated. Safety management and oversight is on the TSB Watchlist.
Following the occurrence, Maritime Air Charter Limited introduced revised procedures to improve the safety of its operations. These include a preflight risk assessment checklist, a requirement to calculate accelerate-stop distance when taking off from shorter runways, and enhanced training, including increased emphasis on stabilized approach criteria and controlled flight into terrain avoidance.
See the investigation page for more information.
Air Canada employees, retirees participate in vintage aircraft flyover in France MONTREAL, April 8, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada is a proud supporter of Vimy Flight, a flyover by vintage aircraft
MONTRÉAL, April 7, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada (TSX: AC) (OTCQX: ACDVF) announced today the retirement of David I. Richardson, Chairman of the Company's Board of Directors. His retirement will
Travel-loving philanthropists support the Air Canada Foundation and SickKids TORONTO, April 7, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - More than $1.1 million was raised Thursday night at the second annual Wanderluxe event presented
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, 6 April 2017 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its investigation report (M16C0016) into the flooding of the fishing vessel Saputi, after it struck a piece of ice and was holed, while fishing in Davis Strait, Nunavut, in February 2016. The report highlights the risks when large fishing vessels are not designed to withstand the flooding of a main compartment and crews do not have access to a damage control plan.
On 21 February 2016, the fishing vessel Saputi, with 30 people on board, was fishing turbot in Davis Strait, Nunavut. At 1935 Atlantic Standard Time, the vessel struck a piece of ice that cracked the hull in the cargo hold. After pumping operations failed to keep up with the ingress of water, the cargo hold was sealed, and it subsequently flooded. The vessel developed a severe list but was able to proceed to Nuuk, Greenland, arriving on 24 February. No injuries were reported.
The investigation determined that, at 1840, the master sighted a single piece of ice on the port side that was not assessed to be of any danger to the vessel. While the master slowly altered the Saputi'scourse to avoid the piece of ice, a wave lifted the vessel, and as the vessel fell off the wave, it made contact with the ice. As a result, a vertical crack in the ship's hull was created, which led to a significant volume of water entering the vessel. The crew of the Saputi unsuccessfully attempted to seal the crack using available materials not specifically intended for damage control. They had also actioned all on board pumps to try controlling the incoming water. If fishing vessels operating in ice-infested waters do not carry a damage control plan and booklet on board, the master and crew may be inadequately prepared for an emergency situation where there is ingress of water, and may be unable to keep the vessel afloat until the arrival of rescue resources.
Early the following day, the master advised Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Halifax that the vessel was unable to keep up with the ingress of water using the pumps on board, and requested additional pumps. Almost six hours later, a Hercules aircraft, tasked by JRCC Halifax, arrived at the Saputi and dropped off four gasoline-powered search and rescue (SAR) pumps to the vessel, which allowed the crew to remove a large volume of water. Shortly after, crew members advised the master that they were having suction issues with all four SAR pumps. Since the situation had deteriorated drastically, all pumping operations were stopped, leaving the cargo hold to flood completely. Large fishing vessels are not required to be designed to withstand the flooding of a main compartment. A naval architect who had completed stability calculations advised that the vessel could remain afloat and stable with the cargo hold flooded. If fishing vessels operating in ice-infested waters are not designed and constructed to withstand the complete flooding of any one of the main compartments, there is a risk that vessels will not be able to remain afloat if they lose their watertight integrity.
In this occurrence, the gasoline-powered pumps provided by SAR resources did not perform efficiently, and therefore did not control the ingress of water. To effectively address an emergency, it is critical that the equipment provided to a vessel in distress by SAR resources perform adequately.
Commercial fishing safety is a TSB Watchlist issue. Although regulations have been published and will likely lower some of the risks associated with outstanding safety deficiencies, gaps remain and these new regulations apply only to small fishing vessels up to 24.4 metres. Future phases of the regulations will address large fishing vessels over 24.4 metres; however, no work has commenced.
See the investigation page for more information.
MONTREAL, April 3, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Klaus Goersch, Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer of Air Canada has resigned effective April 30, 2017. He will continue to lead Air Canada's operations
Dorval, Quebec, 3 April 2017 – In its investigation report (A15Q0126) released today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) found that a loss of directional control led to the September 2015 fatal helicopter accident near Sept-Îles, Quebec. Two passengers sustained fatal injuries, while the pilot and two other passengers suffered serious injuries.
On 2 September 2015, a Bell 206B helicopter operated by Héli-Nord was flying from the airport in Sept-Îles, Quebec, with one pilot and four passengers on board. The purpose of the flight was to inspect a salmon pass on Nipissis River, approximately 20 nautical miles north of Sept-Îles. During the final approach to the landing site at a river camp, a few feet from the ground, the helicopter began an uncommanded rotation to the right. After turning a few times, the helicopter crashed heavily into a rock on its front right side. A fire started in the engine tailpipe, and was immediately extinguished by persons on site.
The investigation determined that the helicopter was operating at a weight and in a flight regime that led to a loss of directional control at an altitude that did not allow any recovery. During the final approach, the pilot noticed that the engine torque had exceeded its limits and that the nose of the helicopter was starting to turn to the right. To counteract the uncommanded turn, the pilot reduced the engine torque while applying full left anti-torque pedal. However, the nose of the aircraft continued turning to the right and the helicopter kept losing altitude. The pilot increased the torque to reduce the rate of descent and tried to gain airspeed, but the right turn rate increased. Realizing that control of the aircraft was lost, the pilot cut the engine power and prepared for impact. The helicopter was in a nose-down position to the right before it collided with terrain. The investigation determined that the pilot's lack of experience on a Bell 206B helicopter with a shorter tail rotor than the one he had previously trained on prevented him from recognizing the loss of tail rotor effectiveness and counteracting it in a timely manner. The TSB also found that, if occupants do not wear safety belts correctly during a flight, there is an increased risk of serious injuries or death in the event of an accident.
See the investigation page for more information.