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Gatineau, Quebec, 27 March 2015 — This Sunday will mark the 25th anniversary of the creation of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB). On March 29, 1990, the TSB was created by an Act of Parliament and given the mandate to investigate marine, pipeline, rail and aviation accidents. The TSB has evolved over the past quarter century establishing itself as a world-class independent, investigative body whose top priority is contributing to the safest possible Canadian transportation system.
"Throughout the years, we have conducted major investigations and have been at the forefront of important changes to the transportation industry,” said Kathy Fox, Chair of the TSB. “Our raison d’être hasn’t changed—we investigate transportation accidents to find out what happened and why, with a view to ensuring those accidents never happen again. And we don’t shy away from putting a spotlight on critical safety issues as we do with our Watchlist.”
In addition to investigating accidents involving Swiss Air 111, Queen of the North, Cougar 91, and the tragedy in Lac-Mégantic, we have been the instigator for several changes made as a result of our findings. These include the requirement for many of today’s aircraft to carry terrain awareness and warning systems; and for safe towing procedures that have significantly reduced safety risks associated with towing small vessels in ice-infested waters. Canadian railway companies have also put in place measures to reduce the dangerous in-train forces that can sometimes cause derailments; and the pipelines throughout our country are now being built to even tougher standards.
In recognition of this milestone, we are launching a TSB@25 Web portal that highlights our accomplishments and the dedication of our people in various ways. It includes:
- A video message from the Chair
- The history of the TSB
- A list of former Chairs
- Blog posts by long-term employees and others
- Employee video profiles
- Photos – 25 years of TSB at work
- Photos – Accident sites: 1990-2015
TSB employees are proud of the role they play and the work they do. Canadians can be assured that the TSB will continue to be diligent in its role of advancing transportation safety during the next 25 years and beyond.
Customers will be able to initiate check-in, receive notifications and more, all on their wrist MONTREAL, March 27, 2015 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada announced today that it has developed an
Dorval, Quebec, 26 March 2015 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its investigation report (A14Q0011) into the runway excursion of a Piper Malibu Mirage aircraft in Alma, Quebec.
On 23 January 2014, a privately operated Piper Malibu Mirage aircraft departed Montréal International (Mirabel) Airport for Alma, Quebec, with a pilot and one passenger on board. The flight was uneventful until the landing when the nose wheel contacted the runway and directional control was lost. The aircraft veered left and departed the runway surface 400 feet after the loss of control. The aircraft came to a stop about 100 feet from the runway edge in a compacted snow bank. There were no injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged.
During the approach, the pilot selected the landing gear down and was provided with an indication in the cockpit that all three landing gears were down and locked. However, the nose gear was not fully down and locked, so the unaware pilot continued with the landing. This accident sequence is consistent with an equipment failure. The part that failed was the landing gear component of the engine mount. It prevented the nose gear from extending fully forward.
The investigation revealed that the right-side nose landing gear component of the engine mount fractured mainly in overstress from a pre-existing fatigue crack. The inspection criteria dictated an examination at 740 flying hours; however, that type of crack may appear before the original scheduled inspection period. On 5 June 2014, Piper Aircraft issued Service Bulletin (SB 1103E) changing the inspection period to 200 hours. The investigation noted that if the requirements prescribed in SB 1103E are not made mandatory for private operators in Canada, there is a continued risk that fatigue cracks may not be discovered in a timely manner.
MONTREAL, March 25, 2015 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada announced today the closing of its previously announced private offering of three tranches of enhanced equipment trust certificates, in the aggregate face
Québec, Quebec, 25 March 2015 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its investigation report (M13L0185) into the 15 December 2013 loss of tow and subsequent grounding of the service vessels I.V. NO. 9, and I.V. NO. 10. The two service vessels broke free from Tug Andre H which was also towing barge I.V. NO. 8. No injuries or pollution were reported.
The investigation revealed that the master had underestimated the risk posed by the forecast northeasterly winds for the area and chose to continue the voyage after a 7-hour delay. Furthermore, the towing arrangement was inadequate for the environmental and operational conditions. The synthetic rope couplers employed in the towing arrangement were in a degraded condition and parted during the voyage, causing the service vessels to break from the tow. The crew of the Andre H. was unable to recover the service vessels that broke free, due to reduced visibility and weather.
The investigation also found that there are risks when towing vessel operators do not have procedures and do not adopt standards to ensure the adequacy of the towing arrangement and the condition of the towing equipment. Furthermore, there is a risk of collision when operators and masters do not ensure that the prescribed navigation lights and shapes are exhibited.
Richmond Hill, Ontario, 18 March 2015 - The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is deploying a team to an accident involving a Piper Cherokee aircraft that occurred north of Georgian Bay, Ontario. The TSB will gather information and assess the occurrence.
The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.
For more information, contact:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
On 07 March 2015, Canadian National (CN) crude oil unit train U70451-02 was proceeding eastward on CN's Ruel Subdivision near Gogama, Ontario. The train crew was composed of a locomotive engineer, a trainee and a conductor. The train was equipped with 2 head-end locomotives hauling 94 Class 111 tank cars loaded with Petroleum Crude Oil (UN 1267). The train was 6,089 feet long and weighed 14,355 tons.
Around 02:42, while travelling at about 43 mph, a train-initiated emergency brake application occurred near Mile 88.70. Looking back, the crew observed a fireball about 700 feet behind the locomotives. They detached the locomotives and first 5 cars behind the locomotives from the derailed cars, and pulled clear. The temperature at the time was about -10°C.
The train was designated as a “Key Train”Footnote 1 operating on a “Key Route.”Footnote 2 The accident occurred about 3 kilometres west of the town of Gogama, Ontario, in the vicinity of a CN rail bridge that traversed the Makami river. The CN Emergency Response Assistance Plan (ERAP) was implemented and a full incident command structure was established in the Gogama town hall. There were no injuries reported and no evacuation was required. All fires were extinguished by 10 March 2015.
What we know
Site examination revealed that the 6th to the 44th cars behind the locomotives (39 cars in total) had derailed. The 6th and 7th cars derailed to the south, but made it across the bridge to the east side of the river. The derailed trailing end of the 7th car struck the south side of the bridge structure as it crossed, the car rolled down the east embankment and its bottom outlet valve was compromised and released product. The last 2 cars (43rd and 44th) derailed but remained upright and came to rest near mile 88.75 on the west side of the river. The remaining cars derailed near the west end of the bridge. Two of the cars were submerged in the river, 3 cars were partially submerged in the river and the rest were in a pile on the west river bank (see Photo 1). A number of the cars were breached, released product and ignited a large pool fire which destroyed the steel rail bridge. Most of the remaining cars sustained fire damage ranging from minor to severe. About 700 feet of track was destroyed.
While firefighters dealt with the fire, investigators from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) examined the area at the west end of the bridge and recovered a section of broken rail within a plug rail joint that had been installed 2 days prior to the accident (see Photo 2). The plug rail was put in place as a repair for an in-service thermite weld failure identified previously at that location. The recovered rail components were sent to the TSB Engineering Laboratory in Ottawa for further analysis.
The TSB conducted a preliminary damage assessment of the derailed tank cars. All of the Class 111 tank cars were constructed in the last 3 years, and were compliant with the industry's CPC-1232 standard. In comparison with the other general service “legacy” Class 111 tank cars, these tank cars have some enhancements which include half-head shields, improved top and bottom fitting protection, and normalized steel.
Preliminary assessment revealed that 1 tank car at the head-end of the derailment sustained minor damage and 2 tank cars at the tail-end of the derailment had no damage. The remaining derailed tank cars sustained more significant damage, releasing product that sustained a large pool fire. At least 5 of the tank cars exhibited thermal tears from exposure to the pool fire. Initial impressions are that these Class 111 tank cars performed similarly to those involved in the Lac-Mégantic accident. The amount of product released to atmosphere, the river or ground has not yet been estimated, but will be determined as site mitigation and clean-up continues.
Transportation of flammable liquids by rail
The transportation of flammable liquids by rail has been identified as one of the key risks to the transportation system and it is included on the TSB's 2014 Watchlist. The TSB has been pointing out the vulnerability of Class 111 tank cars for many years, and the Board has called for tougher standards for all Class 111 tank cars, not just new ones, to reduce the likelihood of product release during accidents. In Lac-Mégantic, investigators found that, even at lower speeds, the unprotected Class 111 tank cars ruptured, releasing crude oil which fuelled the fire.
The tank cars involved in the previous Gogama derailment (R15H0013) which occurred on 14 February 2015, and the tank cars involved in this derailment (R15H0021) were compliant with the CPC-1232 standard and were not equipped with a thermal protection system.Footnote 3 Preliminary assessments of the tank cars involved in both derailments identified that the derailed cars sustained significant damage and did not perform as well as expected. Until a more robust tank car standard with enhanced protection for all tank cars transporting flammable liquids is implemented for North America, the risk will remain.
In response to TSB Recommendation R14-01 issued in January 2014, Transport Canada (TC) adopted the TP 14877 standard in the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations on 02 July 2014, requiring all new tank cars built for the transportation of flammable liquids in Canada to meet the CPC-1232 specifications. At that time, the TSB warned TC that this standard was not sufficient and that more needed to be done to provide an adequate level of protection.
On 11 March 2015, TC announced proposed upgraded standards for a new series of tank car—the TC-117. The new standard would require all new tank cars built for the transport of flammable liquids to be constructed using thicker and more impact-resistant steel and to be equipped with jacketed thermal protection, full height head shields, top fittings protection and improved bottom outlet valves. The phase-out of legacy Class 111 tank cars (including the CPC-1232 tank cars) in flammable liquid service would be gradually implemented using a risk-based approach, taking into consideration the features of the tank cars and the characteristics of the flammable liquid being transported.
While the proposed standards look promising, the TSB has concerns about the implementation timeline, given initial observations of the performance of CPC-1232 cars in recent derailments. If older tank cars, including the CPC-1232 cars, are not phased out sooner, then the regulator and industry need to take more steps to reduce the risk of derailments or consequences following a derailment carrying flammable liquids.
“Canadians expect their government to ensure that the risks posed by the transportation of flammable liquids are minimized to the greatest extent possible,” said Kathy Fox, Chair of the TSB. “I am reiterating my concern expressed in letters I sent to both the Minister of Transport and the Acting Administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration in the United States in October 2014, in which I urged TC and its U.S. counterparts to adopt the highest possible standards for tank cars carrying flammable liquids, and replace or retrofit existing tank cars as soon as practicable so that they meet new standards.”
The CN Ruel Subdivision consists of single main track which extends westward from Capreol, Ontario (Mile 0.00) to Hornepayne, Ontario (Mile 296.20). It is primarily composed of continuous welded rail (CWR) and is rated as Class 4 track under the TC-approved Track Safety Rules. Class 4 track permits track speeds of up to 60 mph for freight trains and 80 mph for passenger trains. However, there were permanent slow orders on much of the subdivision to protect against various infrastructure and track maintenance issues.
Preliminary indications are that track infrastructure failures may have played a role in each of the Gogama accidents and a 3rd accident that involved a mixed manifest train on the Ruel Subdivision near Minnipuka, Ontario on 5 March 2015. Petroleum crude oil unit trains transporting heavily-loaded tank cars will tend to impart higher than usual forces to the track infrastructure during their operation. These higher forces expose any weaknesses that may be present in the track structure, making the track more susceptible to failure. Given the potential damage of a train derailment, particularly when petroleum crude oil unit trains are involved, the TSB has issued a Safety Advisory Letter calling on TC to review the risk assessments conducted for the Ruel Subdivision, assess the track infrastructure condition and determine whether additional risk control measures are required when operating a ”Key Train” on this “Key Route.”
The investigation is ongoing and the next steps include:
- Examination of rail components from the derailment site.
- Sampling and testing of product from select tank cars.
- Review of Wheel Impact Load Detector records for the train and previous trains.
- Review of track infrastructure maintenance records for the area.
- Review of CN Engineering Track Standards.
- Review of TC-approved Track Safety Rules.
- Review and evaluation of ERAP and emergency response.
- Conducting of additional interviews as required.
Once all remaining product has been removed from the tank cars and they have been cleaned and purged, the TSB will complete a detailed damage assessment of the cars. The object of the assessment is to compare the performance of these tank cars against the known performance of the legacy Class 111 tank cars that were involved in the Lac-Mégantic accident and the CPC-1232 compliant Class 111 cars involved in the previous CN unit crude oil train accident. This will include further failure analysis, testing and metallurgical examination at the TSB Engineering Laboratory.
Air Canada Jetz signed to six-year contract with six of Canada's major teams MONTREAL, March 17, 2015 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada proudly announced today that it is the airline
Richmond, British Columbia, 25 February 2015 – In its report into a 2013 British Columbia (B.C.) float plane accident (A13P0278), the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) expressed its concern that, if multiple modifications are made without adequate documentation of the effects on aircraft handling, pilots may lose control of the aircraft due to unknown aircraft performance.
“Pilots need accurate information on how an aircraft will fly after modifications have been made to it,” said Joseph Hincke, TSB Board Member. “We are concerned that this information is not available consistently and that accidents will continue to occur as a consequence.”
On 24 October 2013, a CBE Construction Ltd. (Air Cab) Cessna C-185E float plane left Port McNeill, B.C. water aerodrome with a pilot and 2 passengers on board for a charter flight to West Cracroft Island, B.C. At 1140, while maneuvering for landing on water, the aircraft experienced an accelerated aerodynamic stall while being flown at an altitude from which recovery was not possible before it collided with the terrain on a small island in Potts Lagoon, West Cracroft Island. The aircraft was destroyed and the 3 occupants were fatally injured.
The investigation found that several approved modifications (Supplemental Type Certificates or STCs) had been made to the aircraft that resulted in undocumented performance and handling characteristics and that the pilot's expectation of the aircraft's performance capabilities may not have been accurate. The investigation also identified a risk if multiple modifications are installed without adequate guidance on how to evaluate and document the effects on aircraft handling and performance. Further, there is an increased risk of stall accidents if advanced stall warning systems, such as angle of attack indicators, are not incorporated on aircraft.
Air Cab has begun emphasizing an awareness of aircraft modifications and their effect on aircraft handling during pilot initial and recurrent training. It is also in the process of implementing a G switch on its aircraft tracking system as a back up to the aircraft's electronic locator transmitter, and installing a disconnect G switch on its aircraft batteries to reduce the risk of a post-crash fire, in response to other issues identified during the investigation.
In November of 2014, the TSB announced that it would conduct a Safety Issues Investigation into Canadian air taxi operations to understand the risks that persist in this important sector of the aviation industry. The study will engage industry, the regulator and other stakeholders to gain a full understanding of the issues affecting air taxi operations. The Board may make recommendations to address any identified systemic deficiencies.
Richmond Hill, Ontario, 26 February 2015 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is investigating a landing accident involving a Jazz DHC8-100 aircraft, that occurred on 24 February 2015 at Sault Ste. Marie Airport, Ontario. There were no reported injuries and the aircraft damage is being assessed.
Approach-and-landing accidents are a TSB Watchlist issue.