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Competitors from Brazil to arrive at Toronto Pearson August 23 TORONTO, Aug. 22, 2016 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada will today begin flying members of Canada's Olympic team back to Canada
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Dorval, Quebec, 17 August 2016 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigation report (A13Q0098) released today shows that fuel exhaustion led to the forced landing of a Beechcraft King Air 100 in a field near the St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil Airport, Quebec, in June 2013. The TSB also identified deficiencies in the pilot’s performance and the company’s supervision of flights, as well as weaknesses in Transport Canada’s (TC) process for approving operators’ appointments of operations management personnel and in the regulatory oversight of flight operations.

On 10 June 2013 at 1700 Eastern Daylight Time, a Beechcraft King Air 100 operated by Aviation Flycie Inc. took off from the Montréal/St-Hubert Airport (CYHU), Quebec, with one pilot and three passengers on board for a test flight. While on its way back to the airport, 24 minutes after take-off, the aircraft ran out of fuel. The pilot decided to divert to the St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil Airport. When the pilot realized that the aircraft would not reach the runway, the pilot attempted a forced landing in a field near the airport. The forced landing ended in an aerodynamic stall and the aircraft struck the ground 30 feet short of the selected field. The aircraft was extensively damaged, and the four occupants sustained minor injuries.

While preparing for the flight, the pilot relied exclusively on the fuel gauges, misread them, and assumed that the aircraft had enough fuel on board for the flight. During the flight, the pilot did not monitor the fuel gauges and, when returning to the airport, decided to extend the flight to practise a simulated instrument landing approach, without noticing there was insufficient fuel to complete it.

The investigation found the pilot had a history of performance that did not meet expected standards to act as pilot-in-command for that aircraft type. Despite a marginal performance during the check flight, the pilot had successfully passed a pilot proficiency check, and TC had approved the individual's appointment to the position of chief pilot.

Meanwhile, the company's operations manager, who had no previous experience in commercial air carrier operations, was unable to fully appreciate the significance of the chief pilot's marginal performance or to detect deviations from regulations in the commercial flights performed over the company's first three months of operations, which preceded the accident. TC had also approved the appointment of the operations manager.

In addition, the investigation revealed that the person responsible for maintenance (PRM), a new co-pilot on the company's BE10, had no previous experience in maintenance or in air taxi flight operations. TC had also approved the appointment of the PRM.

The TSB determined that TC's appointment approval process was not effective and that, once the appointments had been approved, the management team's inability to perform the duties and responsibilities was not grounds for TC to revoke them.

The TSB has identified safety management and oversight as a Watchlist issue. As this occurrence demonstrates, some transportation companies are not effectively managing their safety risks. The Board has been calling on TC to implement regulations requiring all operators in the aviation industry to have formal safety management processes, and for TC to oversee these companies' safety management processes.

See the investigation page for more information.

Published in Transportation Safety Board of Canada
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Edmonton, Alberta, 11 August 2016 – In its investigation report (A15W0069) released today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) found that during firefighting operations, the aircraft encountered a fire whirl, which led to a loss of control and impact with terrain. The pilot was fatally injured in the accident, which occurred near Cold Lake, Alberta, on 22 May 2015.

The Conair Air Tractor AT-802A Fire Boss was operating as Tanker 692 in support of wildfire management operations 25 nautical miles northwest of Cold Lake. It was the last in a formation of four Fire Boss aircraft that had just completed two drops on the northern edge of the fire. The tankers were conducting their drops at a specified bombing height of approximately 150 to 200 feet above ground level (agl), and after releasing their loads, the aircraft would climb back up to the circuit height of approximately 1000 feet agl. As Tanker 692 was coming out of its third drop, it encountered severe turbulence, which caused the aircraft to enter an undesired nose-up attitude, then roll to the left and pitch nose-down. The aircraft's low altitude while fighting the wildfire made recovery improbable, resulting in impact with the terrain.

The investigation determined that the aircraft had encountered a tornado-like event generated by the fire, which is known as a fire whirl. A number of factors such as a large heat source, unstable atmosphere, and low winds can cause a fire whirl. When Tanker 692 completed its third drop on the fire, the pilot could not see the fire whirl and would not have anticipated it being in the flight path.

The investigation found that if fire behaviour training is not provided to personnel involved in fire-suppression activities, there is a risk of aircraft being flown into unsafe conditions. The investigation also found that not all types of restraint system adequately protect pilots from the effects of severe turbulence, although this did not contribute to the accident.

Following the occurrence, Conair Group Inc. commissioned a fire behaviour study to look into the environmental conditions during the occurrence, and contracted a study into the accident. In addition, the company added a session to its training program focused on awareness of environmental conditions and the dangers around forest fires. It also conducted an operational review and installed five-point harnesses in its AT-802 fleet.

See the investigation page for more information.

Published in Transportation Safety Board of Canada
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Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, 5 August 2016 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is issuing a clarification concerning investigation report M15A0189, which it released on 2 August 2016. It emphasizes that the accident and fatality statistics for commercial fishing vessels data in Table 3 of the report, are for Newfoundland and Labrador, not for Canada as a whole.

From 2000 to 2015, there were 31 commercial fishing-related fatalities in Newfoundland and Labrador, and 189 in Canada.

Loss of life on fishing vessels is an issue on the TSB's Watchlist, and the Board completed a Safety Issues Investigation into fishing safety in 2012. The Board continues to call for concerted and coordinated action by federal and provincial authorities and by leaders in the fishing community to improve the safety culture in fishing operations.

See the investigation page for more information.

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Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, 2 August 2016 – In its investigation report (M15A0189) released today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is again emphasizing the wide range of safety risks that persist for small fishing vessels.

On the evening of 16 June 2015, the small fishing vessel CFV 130214, an open boat with three people on board, was reported overdue from a crab fishing trip in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador. Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Halifax initiated a search, and the bodies of all three crew members were found the next day on Bar Haven Island. The crew members were not wearing personal flotation devices. The vessel was not found and is believed to have sunk.

As the vessel was lost at sea and there were no witnesses or survivors, the investigation could not determine with certainty the primary cause or causes of the occurrence.

With only a few weeks left in the fishing season and none of his crab quota filled, the master was under increased pressure to fish. The master had modified a smaller secondary vessel, a 7.1-metre open boat, to use for crab fishing while his primary vessel was under repair, but the modifications were not assessed or tested for stability. The investigation found that the added weight from the modifications, combined with the weight of the crew members, bait, ice, and the catch on board would have significantly reduced the vessel's freeboard, making it more susceptible to taking on water, with a negative impact on the vessel's stability. Deteriorating weather and sea conditions put the heavily loaded vessel at further risk of taking on water.

To lease another vessel, the master would have had to formally ask the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) for an exemption from the Fisheries Licensing Policy for the Newfoundland and Labrador Region. It could not be determined why the master did not do so, or whether the request would have been approved. It also could not be determined whether the master fully understood that an exemption was an option or how he might have obtained one. The investigation found that there was no information about the exemption on the DFO website or in any other publication. If information about the fisheries licensing policy is not disseminated proactively to fishermen, they may not seek approval to use the safest means available to them to go fishing, thereby increasing the risk to safe fishing operations.

The investigation ascertained that the open boat was not carrying a distress communication device (it was not required to have one on board). Previous TSB investigations have found that carrying an emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) can help save lives, and the Board has recommended (TSB Recommendation M00-09) that small fishing vessels carry one or other similar equipment. An EPIRB automatically sends a distress signal once it is immersed in water, so that search and rescue can be initiated immediately.

Loss of life on fishing vessels is a Watchlist issue, and a Safety Issues Investigation into fishing safety was completed in 2012. The Board continues to call for concerted and coordinated action by federal and provincial authorities and by leaders in the fishing community to improve the safety culture in fishing operations.

See the investigation page for more information.

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MONTREAL, Aug. 2, 2016 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada's brand value has soared 88 per cent to $1.8 billion over last year placing it among the Top 50 most valuable Canadian brands,
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Record second quarter EBITDAR of $605 millionOperating income of $277 millionAir Canada continues to expect full year 2016 EBITDAR to increase 4 to 8 per cent from record full year 2015 EBITDARMONTRÉAL,
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MONTRÉAL, July 28, 2016 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada today announced that, effective July 29, 2016, its Class A variable voting shares and Class B voting shares will trade on OTCQX
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Richmond, British Columbia, 21 July 2016 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) found that a lack of familiarity with the territory and the misinterpretation of a communication contributed to a Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) train exceeding its limits of authority near Cranbrook, British Columbia, in March 2015, according to its investigation report (R15V0046) released today. No injuries were reported and no dangerous goods were involved.

On 11 March 2015, a CP rail traffic controller stopped a train, consisting of two locomotives and 130 empty cars near Mile 102 on the Cranbrook Subdivision, after the train had departed Cranbrook and travelled east for five miles without authorization. There were no conflicting movements.

The investigation determined that the train had been operated past the east cautionary limits sign at Cranbrook without the required clearance. During the train’s approach to Cranbrook, the train crew had contacted the assistant trainmaster at Fort Steele by radio. The crew members misinterpreted information from the assistant trainmaster, understanding it to be confirmation that the cautionary limits at Cranbrook extended all the way to Fort Steele. As a result, they believed that no additional authority was required and that they could proceed past Cranbrook without requesting a clearance from the rail traffic controller.

These events occurred at about 0120, a time of day that is close to a known circadian rhythm low point when alertness can be compromised. During periods of reduced alertness, there is an increased risk of inadvertent errors such as the misinterpretation of communications.

Although they were qualified for their respective positions, the train crew of three CP management (non-unionized) employees were not familiar with the territory. The investigation identified that if railway management employees who operate trains are not sufficiently familiar with the territory, the limits of operating authority may not be consistently observed, increasing the number of these occurrences and associated risks. It also observed that if the regulations do not adequately address the requirements for training, certification, and territory familiarization for railway management employees who operate trains, trains may be crewed with management employees who are not sufficiently experienced, increasing the risk of unsafe train operations.

Following this occurrence, CP redesignated Cranbrook Yard as a siding. The cautionary limits at the yard were removed, and an adjacent subdivision was combined to operate as one. In addition, CP formalized a requirement for territory familiarization for management crews.

See the investigation page for more information.


The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

For more information, contact:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Media Relations
Telephone: 819-994-8053
Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

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MONTREAL, July 21, 2016 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada today announced that it has signed agreements with three of its business partners that will help support the creation of a Western
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