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MONTREAL, May 26, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Michael Rousseau, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, will make a presentation to investors at the National Bank Financial 7th Annual Quebec Conference on
Edmonton, Alberta, 25 May 2017 – The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its investigation report (R15E0173) into a 2015 Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) derailment at Scotford Yard near Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, citing that a crew member did not observe a switch lined against the movement which subsequently damaged the switch.
On 8 December 2015, at about 1515 Mountain Standard Time, a CP switching assignment, which was being operated by a remote control locomotive system, derailed four loaded tank cars while performing switching operations at Scotford Yard. The derailed tank cars contained styrene monomer, a flammable liquid. Two cars remained upright, one car came to rest on its side, and one car rolled into a ditch, coming to rest upside down and releasing most of its contents. The majority of the product was recovered and disposed of during the initial response and through the removal of the contaminated soil during site remediation. There were no injuries.
The investigation determined that the forward movement of the train through a switch that was lined against the movement had damaged the switch. Unaware that the switch had been damaged, the crew then reversed the movement over the damaged switch, resulting in the derailment of four tank cars. The investigation found that the crew member on the leading end of the movement did not observe the visual cues indicating that the switch was lined in the opposite direction from the intended route.
Following the occurrence, CP initiated a number of safety actions including increasing performance monitoring, implementing pre-shift briefings, and providing mentoring and coaching sessions to ensure improved efficiency.
The transportation of flammable liquids by rail is a TSB Watchlist 2016 issue. As this occurrence demonstrates, the transportation of flammable liquids by rail across North America has created an elevated risk that needs to be mitigated effectively. Based on this investigation and previous ones, Board recommendations, and other safety communications, the TSB reiterates that flammable liquids must be shipped in more robust tank cars to reduce the likelihood of a dangerous goods release during accidents.
See the investigation page for more information.
Richmond Hill, Ontario, 24 May 2017 – In the release of its investigation report (A16O0016) today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) found that the misinterpretation of a taxi instruction issued by the ground controller led to the January 2016 Air Canada runway incursion and risk of collision at the Lester B. Pearson International Airport (CYYZ) in Toronto, Ontario.
On 30 January 2016, an Air Canada Embraer aircraft was operating as flight ACA726 on a scheduled flight from CYYZ in Toronto, Ontario, to LaGuardia Airport, New York, United States. While taxiing for departure, ACA726 taxied across the hold line and onto Runway 24R without authorization at the same time that an Air Canada Airbus, operating as flight ACA1259, was on final approach for landing on the same runway. As ACA726 was turning onto the runway centreline, the ACA1259 flight crew reported to the airport controller that there was an aircraft on the runway and that they were conducting an overshoot.
The investigation determined that, after completing their pre-departure preparations, the flight crew's expectation that they would quickly receive an authorization to take off, combined with the plain-language phraseology used by the ground controller, likely contributed to the crew's misunderstanding of the taxi instruction. Due to this misinterpretation, ACA726 taxied across the hold line and onto Runway 24R without authorization from the airport controller. This occurrence demonstrates how errors in communication can happen and why the use of standard phraseology that reinforces the clearance limit has the potential to improve safety. If air traffic controllers are not required to use standard phraseology that reinforces the need to hold short of a departure runway, there is an increased risk of miscommunication leading to runway incursions.
The investigation also found that the runway incursion monitoring and conflict alert system (RIMCAS) did not provide a timely warning to the airport controller to provide alternate instructions to the flight crews.
The risk of collisions on runways has been a key safety issue on the TSB Watchlist since 2010. The Board is concerned that unless better defenses are put in place to reduce these occurrences, the risk of a serious collision between aircraft remains.
Following this occurrence, Air Canada Flight Operations convened a working group to review this incident as well as other incursion incidents to identify any common causal factors and to develop recommendations to prevent future incursions. NAV CANADA performed a site review which resulted in adjustments that will increase the RIMCAS warning time to the air traffic controller when a departing aircraft enters the area without authorization.
See the investigation page for more information.
Canadian residents can win one of 150 pairs of round-trip tickets anywhere the carrier flies in Canada MONTREAL, May 23, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada recently launched its "See: Canada" campaign
MONTREAL, May 18, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Air Canada is in receipt of the TSB report on the incident involving AC624 in March 2015. We are appreciative of the TSB's efforts to
Halifax, Nova Scotia, 18 May 2017 – In its investigation report (A15H0002) released today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) found that approach procedures, poor visibility and airfield lighting led to the 2015 collision with terrain of Air Canada Flight 624 at the Halifax/Stanfield International Airport in Nova Scotia.
On 29 March 2015, an Air Canada Airbus A320 was operating as Flight 624 from Toronto, Ontario to Halifax, Nova Scotia with 133 passengers and 5 crew members on board. At approximately 00:30 local time, while conducting a non-precision localizer approach to Runway 05 during a snowstorm, the aircraft severed power lines and then struck the snow-covered ground approximately 740 feet before the runway threshold. The aircraft continued airborne through the localizer antenna, and struck the ground twice more before sliding along the runway and coming to rest about 1900 feet beyond the runway threshold. The aircraft was evacuated using the inflatable slides. Twenty-five people sustained injuries and were taken to hospital. The aircraft was destroyed.
The investigation found that the flight crew had set the autopilot to fly the appropriate constant descent flight path angle. Because company procedures did not require the flight crew to monitor the aircraft's altitude and distance to the runway, the crew did not notice that wind variations had caused the aircraft's flight path to move further back from the selected flight path.
Although requested by the flight crew during the approach, the runway lights were not adjusted to their maximum setting. At the time, the tower controller was preoccupied with snowplows on the runway and nearby aircraft on the taxiway. When the aircraft reached the minimum descent altitude for the approach, the flight crew saw some lights, which they interpreted as sufficient visual cues to continue the approach below the minimum descent altitude, expecting the lights to become more visible as they got closer to the airport. It was only in the last few seconds of the flight, after the pilots disengaged the autopilot to land manually, that they then realized that the aircraft was too low and too far back. Although they initiated a go-around immediately, the aircraft struck terrain short of the runway.
Following the occurrence, Air Canada and the Halifax International Airport Authority took safety actions to address the deficiencies identified in this investigation. Air Canada provided its pilots with more specific guidance on required visual references for landing approaches, made explicit warnings on the limitations of the autopilot and vertical navigation using the Airbus Flight Path Angle mode, and now requires instrument monitoring during all approaches when below the minimum descent altitude. For its part, the Halifax International Airport Authority upgraded the approach lighting for Runway 05, reviewed its emergency response plan and made upgrades to emergency assets, including backup power. NAV CANADA published a satellite-based approach on Runway 05 that provides lateral and vertical guidance to suitably-equipped aircraft.
The investigation highlights several factors as to risk, regarding passenger safety. It is important that passengers pay attention to the pre-flight safety briefings, review the safety features card and wear clothing that is appropriate to the season. During an evacuation, passengers must also leave any carry-on items behind to avoid creating delays. This accident also reinforces the need to address the outstanding TSB recommendation (A15-02) to require child restraint systems for infants and young children, to provide an equivalent level of safety to adults aboard commercial aircraft.
See the investigation page and backgrounder for more information.
Offering improved Star Alliance connections and brand new Maple Leaf Lounge MONTREAL, May 17, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Effective today, Air Canada's flights and Maple Leaf Lounge at Los Angeles International Airport
MONTREAL, May 16, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - In response to the announcement today by the Canadian Government of its proposed Transportation Modernization Act, Air Canada provided the following statement: Air Canada welcomes
Dorval, Québec, 16 May 2017 – In its investigation report (A15Q0075) released today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada cited high speed, a tailwind, a long landing and delayed use of deceleration devices while landing in heavy rain showers, as contributing factors in the 2015 runway overrun of a Westjet Boeing 737 in Montréal, Quebec.
On 5 June 2015, a WestJet Boeing 737 was operating on a scheduled flight from Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport (CYYZ), to Montreal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport (CYUL). While approaching CYUL, the flight crew observed heavy rain on the weather radar. Once the aircraft was established on final approach, it was cleared to land on Runway 24L. The aircraft touched down beyond the normal touchdown zone and came to rest on the grass past the end of the runway. There were no injuries and no damage to the aircraft.
The investigation determined that the target approach speed was inaccurately calculated, and the aircraft crossed the runway threshold at a speed that was faster than recommended. This, combined with a tailwind and a slightly high flare, resulted in the aircraft touching down beyond the normal touchdown zone, thus reducing the amount of runway available for the aircraft to come to a stop. Additionally, following touchdown, the delayed and non-maximal use of deceleration devices, combined with viscous hydroplaning while landing in heavy rain showers, increased the distance required for the aircraft to come to a stop. An instruction from the control tower to exit at the end of the runway contributed to the minimal use of deceleration devices early in the landing roll, as the crew were attempting to expedite their exit at the end of Runway 24L.
When a runway overrun occurs, it is important that an aircraft have an adequate safety area beyond the end of the runway to reduce adverse consequences. In this occurrence, Runway 24L had a runway end safety area that allowed the aircraft to decelerate in a controlled manner; no one was injured and the aircraft was not damaged. However, there is currently no requirement in Canada for runways to meet international standards and recommended practices for runway end safety areas (TSB recommendation A07-06). Runway overruns continue to occur at Canadian airports and are identified as a key safety issue on the 2016 TSB Watchlist.
WestJet debriefed all training pilots on the occurrence, and the flight safety annual ground school program now covers a number of topics such as overrun characteristics, as well as an incident review of this occurrence.
See the investigation page for more information.
MONTREAL, May 16, 2017 /CNW Telbec/ - Michael Rousseau, Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer, will participate in a discussion at the RBC Capital Markets Canadian Automotive, Industrial & Transportation